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This Article asks whether the openness to court-packing expressed 
by a number of Democratic presidential candidates (e.g., Pete Buttigieg) 
is democratically defensible. More specifically, it asks whether it is 
possible to break the apparent link between demagogic populism and 
court-packing, and it examines three possible ways of doing this via Bruce 
Ackerman’s dualist theory of constitutional moments—a theory which 
offers the possibility of legitimating problematic pathways to 
constitutional change on democratic but non-populist grounds. In the end, 
the Article suggests that an Ackermanian perspective offers just one, 
extremely limited pathway to democratically legitimate court-packing in 
2021: namely, where a Democratic President and Congress would be 
willing to limit themselves to using court reform as a means of repudiating 
the Republican Party’s constitutional gains but not as a means of pursuing 
(in fact or in appearance) their own comprehensive reform agenda. The 
question that this analysis leaves hanging is whether this pathway remains 
satisfactory when concerns aside from democratic legitimacy are factored 
into the equation, such as a concern with the protection of certain 
fundamental rights, or with the possibility of public and institutional 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, court-packing has become increasingly synonymous 
with authoritarian populism1 because of its use by right-wing populists in 
various countries2 as a way of avoiding institutional oversight and scrutiny 
(a key hallmark of modern populism). At the same time, though, as the 
United States Democratic Party’s presidential campaigns trundled on, and 
as potential nominees grappled with how to distinguish their politics from 
the current President’s populism, court-packing began gaining traction as 
a potentially legitimate and non-populist legislative option for a 
Democratic President and Congress in 2021. According to a recent article 
on the website Mother Jones, court-packing started creeping into  
the Democratic mainstream when presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg 
claimed during a public appearance that it would be a reasonable  
response to the problematic tactics that the Republican Party has recently 
 
 1. For an analysis of the authoritarian populism now sweeping the world, see JAN-WERNER 
MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016). On the link between populism and court-packing, see Andrew 
Arato, Populism, Constitutional Courts, and Civil Society, in JUDICIAL POWER: HOW 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AFFECT POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS 318, 318–41 (Christine Landfried 
ed., 2019). While the term “populism” has been used lately to cover all manner of political sins, this 
Article will follow Müller’s analysis by emphasizing two core elements: anti-institutionalism and anti-
pluralism. On the one hand, anti-institutionalism refers to the tendency of populists to reject 
institutional checks on their authority, specifically on the grounds that “they, and they alone, represent 
the people.” MÜLLER, supra, at 3 (emphasis added). On the other hand, anti-pluralism refers to the 
tendency of populists to conflate the people with their supporters, see, e.g., MÜLLER, supra, at 4–5, 
thereby lending a twisted plausibility to their claims that they authentically and fully represent “the 
people.” 
 2. Poland’s experience under the Law and Justice Party is a prime example of this (an example 
to which this Article will occasionally refer). See Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in 
Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding, JUDGES F. REV. 104 (2018); see 
also Piotr Mikuli, The Declining State of the Judiciary in Poland, INT’L J. CONST. L. I-CONNECT 
BLOG (May 15, 2018), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/05/the-declining-state-of-the-judiciary-in-
poland/ [https://perma.cc/A8ZG-7KGW]. 
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used to ideologically reshape the federal judiciary and, by derivation,  
the Constitution.3 
To rehash the well-known story on these Republican tactics, first 
there was Merrick Garland, President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee 
who was “stonewalled”4 by a Republican-controlled Senate on extremely 
questionable grounds.5 Then, more recently, there was Brett Kavanaugh, 
whose Supreme Court confirmation was delivered by a Republican Senate 
in the midst of serious concerns over both his judicial temperament6 and 
his history of alleged violence against women (denied aggressively by 
Kavanaugh).7 Surely, Buttigieg suggested, these democratically 
problematic power grabs by Republicans render even seemingly extreme 
counter-tactics like the expansion of the Supreme Court at least thinkable 
for Democrats if (and that’s a big “if”) they take Congress and the 
Presidency in 2021. 
Since Buttigieg’s initial comments, a number of other presidential 
candidates, including Senators Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris, 
joined him in expressing their openness to various forms of court-packing 
(or more specifically, Supreme Court expansion).8 The question is: where 
does this leave us? Is court-packing, a perfectly legal and constitutional 
tactic in the U.S., now politically and morally thinkable too? Or, to put it 
more precisely, can court-packing be framed as a plausibly non-populist 
response to the democratically questionable actions of Senate 
Republicans? This Article attempts to answer this question by engaging 
with the dualist theory of constitutional transformation that has been 
 
 3. See Pema Levy, How Court-Packing Went from a Fringe Idea to a Serious Democratic 
Proposal, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/court-
packing-2020/ [https://perma.cc/FFP4-SSJA]. 
 4. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 150 
(2019). 
 5. See, e.g., Eric Zorn, B-b-but What about the “Biden Rule”?, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/eric-zorn/ct-b-b-but-what-about-the-biden-rule-20170407-
story.html [https://perma.cc/Z2RV-SFR2]. 
 6. For a detailed and critical account of Kavanaugh’s most controversial statements, see 
Laurence Tribe, Opinion, All the Ways a Justice Kavanaugh Would Have to Recuse Himself, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/opinion/justice-kavanaugh-recuse-
himself.html [https://perma.cc/SVC2-DHUQ]; see also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 158–59 
(“At the . . . [Blasey Ford] hearing, Justice Kavanaugh offered testimony that shocked many. He 
lambasted the ‘two-week effort’ effort surrounding the allegations as ‘a calculated and orchestrated 
political hit,’ a form of ‘[r]evenge on behalf of the Clintons.’”). 
 7. See generally Christine Hauser, The Women who Have Accused Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y.  
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-accusers-
women.html [https://perma.cc/55ND-UUBV]. 
 8. See Levy, supra note 3. 
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elaborated over several decades by Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman.9 
While Ackerman’s theory is certainly not the only way of addressing this 
question, it has at least one key benefit when it comes to the quest for a 
non-populist defense of court-packing. Put simply, in contrast with 
populist constitutional theories (e.g., Carl Schmitt’s10) that are ready to 
endorse illegal or uncivil pathways to constitutional change on the basis 
of a change’s popularity, Ackerman’s theory withholds such endorsement 
until a series of stringent tests have been met,11 thereby offering the 
possibility that democratically problematic tactics like court-packing can 
potentially be “made good”12 or “perfected”13 without accepting the 
populist belief that a single group (even a public majority) is alone capable 
of legitimating such tactics (tactics that are broadly at odds, one might say, 
with America’s prevailing “sense of justice”14).15 In other words, 
Ackerman gives us what populism gives us vis-à-vis court-packing—i.e., 
the possibility of democratic legitimation—without giving us populism 
(and in particular, without embracing the core populist doctrine of “organ 
 
 9. Ackerman’s theory is laid out in numerous books and journal articles, but its most 
comprehensive elaboration is in his first volume. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS (1993). 
 10. Schmitt famously distinguished between the higher authority of the “absolute” constitution, 
which he defined as the existent unity of a political community or a people, and the lower authority of 
the “relative” constitution, which he defined as the various constitutional laws in force at a given point 
in time (in force, for Schmitt, at the fragile behest of the political community). On this distinction, see 
CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 59–71 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.) (1928). 
 11. To quote Ackerman:  
The Constitution is, first and foremost, a project in democratic self-rule, providing us with 
institutions and a language by which we may discriminate between the passing show of 
normal politics and the deeper movements in popular opinion which, after much passionate 
debate and institutional struggle, ultimately earn a democratic place in the constitutional 
law of a Republic committed to the rule of We the People.  
Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1178–79 (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
 12. One of the key ways in which Ackerman describes this “making good” is by quoting James 
Madison’s claim, in Federalist No. 40, that an expression of popular support for a reform initiative 
could serve to “blot out antecedent errors and irregularities” in the process of reform—even errors as 
severe as the failure of an institution to act within its legal powers (as per accusations against the 
Philadelphia Convention of which Madison was a part). See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 173–74. 
 13. See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 93 (1998) 
(comparing Ackerman’s model of constitutional lawmaking to the property law doctrine of adverse 
possession, which allows an initially illegal occupant of land to eventually obtain good title by 
complying with a set of stringent tests over time). 
 14. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 450–51 (1971). I do not mean to suggest here that 
Americans today share any common sense of justice, generally; only that many politically engaged 
Americans seem to share a sense of serious anxiety about court-packing, at least to the point where 
they would feel especially aggrieved if it was used by their political opponents to reshape 
constitutional law (more aggrieved than if the judicial appointments process was used, for example). 
 15. Populism, and Ackerman’s departure from populism, will be discussed at the end of Section 
I of the Article, after I have laid out the key features of Ackerman’s constitutional theory. 
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sovereignty,”16 where a single group or entity is presumed competent to 
authoritatively represent the People at a particular moment in time). 
Bearing this benefit of an Ackermanian perspective in mind, this 
Article will begin by offering a brief reconstruction of Ackerman’s theory 
before examining three ways in which court-packing could potentially be 
democratically legitimated within Ackerman’s theory: (1) as a way of 
consolidating an almost completed process of constitutional reform; (2) as 
a way of initiating a process of constitutional reform; and (3) as a 
constitutionally conservative reaction to another group’s attempt to 
achieve the “factional abduction”17 of the judiciary and constitutional law. 
To state my conclusion up front, I will argue that the third option could be 
successfully deployed as a justification for Democratic court-packing in 
2021, provided that the Democrats tread carefully and slowly when it 
comes to pursuing a more comprehensive and controversial package of 
legal reforms. In this regard, one could say that my argument turns on a 
critical distinction between transformative court-packing, as practiced 
recently in countries like Poland,18 and conservative court-packing in the 
face of an attempted but apparently illegitimate transformation of 
constitutional law by others. Thinking about it in this way, I hope, will do 
two things: (1) offer a way for American Democrats to philosophically 
distinguish their seemingly well-intentioned court reform plans from those 
of authoritarian populists like the Law and Justice Party in Poland 
(Erdogan’s Turkey springs to mind as well19) and (2) highlight the fragility 
of such a distinction—because if even Ackerman’s theory of popular 
constitutional change leaves little room for justification despite its 
tolerance of illegal and broadly uncivil reform tactics, it should be clear 
that justification is a delicate business indeed. 
With of all of this said, before proceeding I should make clear that 
the concern of this Article is only with the question of how court-packing 
might be cast as a democratically legitimate or perhaps simply tolerable 
tactic via Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change. By limiting itself to 
this relatively narrow line of inquiry, the Article neglects (or rather 
brackets) at least three other, undeniably important questions relating to 
the prospect of court-packing in 2021. First, excepting a glancing 
comment in its concluding section, the Article does not engage with the 
 
 16. ANDREW ARATO, THE ADVENTURES OF THE CONSTITUENT POWER: BEYOND 
REVOLUTIONS? 23 (2018). 
 17. I borrow this phrasing from JOHAN WILLEM GOUS VAN DER WALT, THE HORIZONTAL 
EFFECT REVOLUTION AND THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 303 (2014). 
 18. See Arato, supra note 1; see also Sadurski, supra note 2. 
 19. On the complexity of the Turkish situation, see Cem Tecimer, Recognizing Court-Packing: 
Perception and Reality in the Case of the Turkish Constitutional Court, VERFBLOG (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/recognizing-court-packing/ [https://perma.cc/4VEP-BDS3]. 
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important question of whether court-packing would remain defensible 
when other standards of legitimacy (or indeed, political wisdom) are 
considered. Second, it does not deal with the equally important question 
of whether court-packing would be narrowly tailored to its aims; the 
question, in other words, of whether the Democrats could use less 
democratically questionable tactics (e.g., issue-specific legislation) to 
overcome the allegedly unjustified slant of the U.S. Supreme Court at 
present.20 Third, it neglects Ackerman’s own recent comments about court 
reform on the grounds that these comments tell us little, if anything, about 
the democratic legitimacy of court-packing.21 While the Article’s failure 
to address these issues obviously limits the force of its conclusions, I have 
isolated the question of democratic legitimacy for an important reason: to 
show how precarious a defense of court-packing is even where only one 
measure (i.e., democratic legitimacy) is considered, and even where a 
theoretical lens (i.e., Ackerman’s) has been chosen to maximize the 
chances of a successful defense. Above all others, it is this point that I hope 
the reader will bear in mind as we proceed to a short reconstruction of 
Ackerman’s theory in the Article’s first section below. 
I. ACKERMAN’S DUALIST THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS 
To begin our engagement with Ackerman, it is perhaps useful to 
consider a distinction that the constitutional theorist Joel Colón-Ríos 
 
 20. In this regard, consider Elizabeth Warren’s proposed response to the hypothetical 
overturning of Roe v. Wade. Associated Press, Elizabeth Warren Unveils Plan to Protect Abortion 
Rights, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-elizabeth-warren-
abortion-platform-2020-story.html [https://perma.cc/XEP7-ZQVF]. Very simply, Warren’s claim is 
that a Democratic government’s best option in this situation would be to forget about constitutional 
law and focus on passing ordinary legislation mimicking Roe’s protections. Id. While such legislation 
would of course be more vulnerable to repeal than an authoritative interpretation of constitutional law, 
it would at least secure the Democrats’ policy preferences during their time in power, provided that 
the Supreme Court does not take the basically unthinkable step of flipping Roe on its head by 
recognizing the constitutional personhood of the unborn and requiring the criminalization of abortion 
(like the German Constitutional Court did in its Erste Abtreibung judgment of 1975, described in VAN 
DER WALT, supra note 17, at 130–51). 
 21. I am aware of a number of comments that Ackerman has made recently on court reform, but 
none of them are strictly relevant here. For example, in his latest book, Revolutionary Constitutions, 
Ackerman discusses the prospect of Democratic court-packing, but this discussion focuses on the way 
that court-packing might play out politically, not on the normative dimension of how it fits with a 
dualist conception of political morality. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: 
CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW 397–403 (2019); see also Bruce Ackerman, 
Opinion, Trust in the Justices of the Supreme Court Is Waning. Here Are Three Ways to Fortify the 
Court, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ackerman-
supreme-court-reconstruction-20181220-story.html [https://perma.cc/FV7D-Z7XJ] (focusing on how 
reforms other than court-packing might bolster the sociological legitimacy of the Supreme Court). 
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makes between two dimensions of democracy.22 While the first dimension 
refers to a people’s capacity to influence every day decision-making 
within their political system23 (e.g., by voting for political representatives), 
the second dimension refers to their more fundamental capacity to actually 
change the system by amending the constitutional laws that give  
it structure24 (or indeed, by making an entirely new constitution).  
For Colón-Ríos, the problem with many modern constitutional 
democracies is that they provide ample room for the first dimension but 
scant room for the second, specifically insofar as modern constitutions 
often include complex amendment formulae that make democratic change 
unlikely.25 How can we speak of democracy, Colón-Ríos’s work wonders, 
if the supposedly sovereign people are incapable of producing radical, 
systemic change; second-dimension change as opposed to the electoral 
“changing of the guards” that defines the first dimension of democracy? 
In his We the People trilogy, Ackerman asks this same question in 
relation to the U.S., but he goes further by asking whether the complex 
amendment requirements contained in Article V of the Constitution have 
really stymied publicly desired, tectonic changes to U.S. constitutional 
law, even if Article V itself has rarely produced such changes.26 In his 
response to this question, Ackerman claims that, rather than suppressing 
initiatives for seismic change completely, the arduous requirements of 
Article V have driven reformists to rely on an alternative, informal 
 
 22. JOEL I. COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE 
QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 36–40 (2012). 
 23. Id. Colón-Ríos also refers to this as “democracy at the level of daily governance.” Id. at 36. 
To suggest that such democracy is present in a particular country, he says, usually means “suggesting 
that that country’s laws and institutions provide for frequent elections, that citizens are allowed to 
associate in different organisations (including political parties) and to express their political opinions 
without fear of punishment.” Id. at 37. 
 24. Id. at 38. To quote Colón-Ríos:  
The second dimension of democracy . . . is not about the daily workings of the state’s 
political apparatus, but about the relation of citizens to their constitution. It looks at how a 
constitutional regime came into existence and how it can be altered . . . [and i]n that 
respect, it revolves around the following two questions: (1) Is this constitution the result of 
a democratic process? (2) Can this constitution be altered through democratic means? 
Id. 
 25. Id. at 17–18. To quote Colón-Ríos:  
Constitutionalism is . . . [partly] characterised by a Lycurgian obsession with permanence, 
a fear of constitutional change according to which a constitution that contains the right 
content—a good, constitutionalist constitution—should also be a finished constitution. 
That is, a constitution that might be improved by correcting some historical mistakes here 
and there . . . but whose fundamental principles and the governmental structures it creates 
should be more or less immutable and therefore placed beyond the scope of popular 
majorities. 
Id. 
 26. See ACKERMAN, supra note 9. 
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amendment track that he calls the “modern system”27 of amendment.28 In 
contrast with the steep federal and state requirements of Article V, the 
modern system applies a more flexible, intertwined pair of national tests 
to constitutional reform movements: (1) a test of “duration”29 and (2) a test 
of dialogue. On the one hand, the test of duration requires that a reform 
movement remains consistently popular, nationally, over the course of a 
“generation”30 (preferably a decade or so). On the other hand, the test of 
dialogue requires that a reform initiative is subjected to an especially 
intense level of public debate, with reformist institutions pitted against 
conservative ones in a contest for the country’s soul. Where an initiative 
passes these tests, Ackerman suggests it will have earned admission to the 
country’s “constitutional canon,”31 which is to say that its institutional 
advocates will have earned the “[a]uthority to speak for the People”32  
and to have their initiative counted as constitutional law. When completed, 
Ackerman refers to this process as a “constitutional moment”—a moment 
when the People themselves can be retroactively regarded as having  
come together to “hammer out a considered judgment on a fundamental 
matter of principle.”33 
In his We the People trilogy, Ackerman has identified four such 
constitutional moments that have occurred over the course of American 
history: the Founding (bypassing the Articles of Confederation rather than 
Article V), Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights Revolution 
(or the “Second Reconstruction”34).35 In all of these cases, for Ackerman, 
 
 27. See id. at 268. 
 28. To quote Sanford Levinson on this aspect of Ackerman’s work:  
There is something at once splendid and perplexing about the Ackermanian scheme of 
epicycles that constitute constitutional amendment outside the formal constraints of Article 
V. Recognizing the patent defects of the 1787 constitutional document, Ackerman has 
devoted what is now the bulk of his career to demonstrating that it is in fact not a fatal bar 
to constitutional rectification. Remarkable things have happened. 
Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution: Tensions in the 
Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644, 2666 (2014). 
 29. Emilios Christodoulidis, The Degenerative Constitutional Moment: Bruce Ackerman and 
The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, 74 MOD. L. REV. 962, 967 (2011) (noting, with 
reference to one of Ackerman’s later books, that the “question of duration” is given pride of place in 
Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change). 
 30. As Ackerman puts it, the “basic unit” of the U.S. Constitution, from his perspective, is the 
“Generation.” Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1997). 
 31. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7 (2014). 
 32. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 4. 
 33. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 55. 
 34. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 1. 
 35. In the first two volumes of his We the People trilogy, Ackerman only counted the Founding, 
Reconstruction, and the New Deal as completed constitutional moments. The Civil Rights Revolution, 
by contrast, was characterized as a seemingly “lesser” moment of “constitutional politics” until its 
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the failure to properly use a legally applicable amendment rule can be 
compensated for, democratically speaking, by compliance with the two, 
intertwined tests proposed above. To understand the dynamics of this 
process more precisely, consider the Civil Rights Revolution, Ackerman’s 
most recent example of a constitutional moment.36 For Ackerman, while 
the starting point of the Civil Rights Revolution as a constitutional moment 
could certainly be cast in terms of the “rich history”37 of social activism 
that preceded legal reform, the really critical moment—the turning point, 
if you like—was when this activism was given institutional recognition at 
the federal level, in this case by the U.S. Supreme Court.38 On this front, 
Ackerman claims that the Supreme Court’s path-breaking decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education39 initiated the informal amendment process 
by issuing what he calls a “constitutional signal”40 to the other branches of 
the federal government (and indeed, to the “ordinary American[s]”41 who, 
for Ackerman, collectively hold the keys to the Constitution). By placing 
the issue of civil rights more firmly on the national agenda, the Court made 
it necessary for Congress and the President to respond, and this in turn 
allowed the American public to pass judgment on their responses, at least 
obliquely, when both institutions came up for reelection. 
What follows such acts of signaling, for Ackerman, is then a slow 
burning, electorally tested battle between constitutional reformists and 
constitutional conservatives. To win this battle, reformists have to keep 
winning across a full generation, but with each victory, they earn a little 
more authority to push the envelope a little further—a little more beyond 
the “constitutional status quo.”42 Coming back to the Civil Rights 
 
eventual admission to the list of full constitutional moments in We the People: The Civil Rights 
Revolution. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 31. On the “lesser” status of the civil rights 
movement in Ackerman’s early work, see Christy Scott, Constitutional Moments and Crockpot 
Revolutions, 25 CONN. L. REV. 967, 975 (1993). 
 36. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 31. Ackerman’s We the People: The Civil Rights 
Revolution is fundamentally concerned, in its entirety, with depicting the civil rights revolution as a 
constitutional moment that followed closely in the footsteps—structurally speaking—of earlier 
constitutional moments like the New Deal.  
 37. Id. at 49. 
 38. Ackerman has taken some flak for his failure to pay closer, more direct attention to the social 
as well as institutional histories that are at stake in periods of constitutional upheaval. For his response 
to these criticisms, see Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 3116 
(2014). 
 39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 40. This concept will be discussed in more detail later in the article. For now, see ACKERMAN, 
supra note 9, at 272–78. 
 41. Christodoulidis, supra note 29, at 968. To quote Christodoulidis: “The ‘ordinary American’ 
is doing a lot of normative work in [Ackerman’s theory].” Id. 
 42. This phrase is used frequently in Ackerman’s work to designate legally dominant 
conceptions of constitutional norms and principles at a given moment. As an example, see ACKERMAN, 
supra note 31, at 3. 
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Revolution, Ackerman sees the 1964 presidential election as a crucial 
legitimating device, specifically insofar as it pitted President Lyndon 
Johnson (LBJ) and his newly passed Civil Rights Act (CRA) against a very 
clear, anti-CRA opponent, Barry Goldwater.43 With Goldwater subjected 
to a “crushing defeat”44 in 1964, the Democrats then used their fresh, 
raised mandate to legitimately pursue further, deeper change by passing 
other “landmark”45 or “super”46 statutes like the Voting Rights Act. 
However, for these statutes to gain decisive admittance into the American 
“constitutional canon,”47 Ackerman claims that one of two things still had 
to happen: either reformists could win another “ratifying election,”48 or 
their opponents could undertake a calculated “switch in time,”49 revealing 
their judgment that constitutional conservatism on the relevant set of 
issues had become publicly indefensible. In the case of the Civil Rights 
Revolution, it was the Republican National Committee (RNC) that 
apparently chose the latter path, the switch in time, by choosing Richard 
Nixon as their presidential candidate—a “man with a long-standing 
commitment to civil rights”50 who ended up playing a “key role in . . . the 
passage of the Fair Housing Act,”51 and in constitutionally consolidating 
the legacy of earlier reformers like LBJ and Justice Earl Warren.52 
What lies behind all of this, to dig a little deeper, is basically a 
“dualistic” distinction between a population of voters (or a small-p people) 
and a People (or a capital-P People) that is made evident by Ackerman’s 
claim that in general, the “People simply do not exist.”53 To explain this 
perhaps perplexing claim, although Ackerman wishes to defend 
constitutional change beyond Article V,54 he fully subscribes to the 
conception of political morality which is inherent in Article V, a 
conception which turns on the idea that the public and congressional 
majorities that are in effect jointly responsible for ordinary lawmaking are 
not equivalent to the sovereign entity, “We the People of the United States 
of America,” the entity that is alone authorized to amend the U.S. 
 
 43. See ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 66–69. 
 44. Id. at 77. 
 45. Id. at 8. 
 46. Id. at 34. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
 48. Id. at 76–79. 
 49. The classic example of such a “switch” is of course the Supreme Court’s repudiation of its 
Lochner-era jurisprudence, starting in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For 
Ackerman’s analysis of this switch, see ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 312–82. 
 50. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 77. 
 51. Id. 
 52. I should make clear that this is Ackerman’s view of Nixon and his position in relation to civil 
rights rather than mine. 
 53. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 263. 
 54. Id. 
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Constitution.55 While this sovereign entity is in many ways little more than 
a “constitutive fiction,”56 Ackerman follows the moral flow of Article V 
closely in supposing that the products of an extraordinary, relatively 
arduous, and highly deliberative lawmaking procedure can be justifiably 
“attributed”57 or “imputed”58 to the People, and that such attribution is 
occasionally necessary to redeem the Jeffersonian promise that “each 
generation . . . [can] choose for itself the form of government it believes 
most promotive of its own happiness.”59 This is Ackerman’s democratic 
dualism in a nutshell: the idea that democratic lawmaking should take 
place along two tracks, one more straightforward track that applies  
to ordinary lawmaking, and a more demanding but crucially still 
accessible track that applies to constitutional or “higher” lawmaking, and 
that comes closer to justifying the “transubstantiation”60 of relevant 
decision-makers into the perpetually absent but representationally 
sovereign figure of “the People” (or more accurately, the “attribution” of 
their decision to the People). 
Fair enough, you might think. But what exactly does this have to do 
with the prospect of court-packing under a Democratic Presidency and 
Congress in 2021? As noted in the introductory section of this Article, the 
value of Ackerman’s theory when it comes to court-packing is that his 
insistence on the supremacy of a slowly emerging popular sovereign offers 
a way of legitimating controversial methods of implementing 
constitutional change61 (like court-packing) without necessarily becoming 
 
 55. As Ackerman notes, this point can be traced all the way back to The Federalist Papers, which 
repeatedly distinguishes not only between elected government and the people themselves but  
also between the people and a popular majority motivated by its own self-interest (Madison refers to 
self-interested majorities as mere “factions” in Federalist No. 10). See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 
165–99. 
 56. See Levinson, supra note 28, at 2653. 
 57. See Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of 
Collective Selfhood, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 11 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008). 
 58. See Emilios Christodoulidis, The Aporia of Sovereignty: On the Representation of the People 
in Constitutional Discourse, 12 KING’S L.J. 111, 119 (2001). 
 59. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Samuel Kercheval, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PERSONAL, 
POLITICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 352 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1967). 
 60. As Ackerman puts it, “no institution of normal politics can be allowed to transubstantiate 
itself into the People.” ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 182. The evident implication of this is that an 
extraordinary institution or coalition of institutions can “transubstantiate itself into the People,” and 
Ackerman’s work addresses itself insistently to the problem of when this conversion is defensible in 
the United States. Id. 
 61. Ackerman evidently takes inspiration from the Founders here:  
To . . . [the Founders], the legally anomalous character of the “convention” was not a sign 
of defective legal status but of revolutionary possibility—that a group of patriots might 
speak for the People with greater political legitimacy than any assembly whose authority 
arose only from its legal form. 
ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 175. 
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an apologist for the populism of, say, the Law and Justice Party in  
Poland (I will say more on this populism in the next paragraph).62 To offer 
some clarification on the way that he thinks about this problem,  
the problem of legal or political-moral “errors”63 in processes of 
constitutional change, Ackerman refers us to property law and the doctrine 
of adverse possession.64 
As Ackerman explains in the second volume of his We the People 
trilogy, the relevance of the comparison to adverse possession lies in the 
fact that, much like his system of informal constitutional amendment, the 
“doctrine of adverse possession allows a concededly illegal occupant of 
land to perfect . . . his title”65 to that land by publicly complying with a set 
of “rigorous conditions”66 and by “successfully maintain[ing] his 
dominion for many years.”67 This leads to a difficult question, though: the 
question of how exactly one ought to view the initial act of occupation or, 
moving from property law back to constitutional law, the dubious tactics 
that end up yielding a constitutional moment a number of years down the 
line. Does the legitimacy of such tactics depend exclusively on the way a 
budding constitutional moment ends up playing out, i.e., can the use of any 
tactics be retroactively vindicated by a subsequently constructed 
manifestation of popular sovereignty? Or, conversely, can we distinguish 
in advance between more and less legitimate tactics in the pursuit of 
informal constitutional change, perhaps to the point where a constitutional 
moment could be deemed invalid if it depended or relied too heavily on 
certain problematic tactics at certain points? 
We will return to these crucial questions at the end of the next 
section,68 but not before offering a short summary of Ackerman’s theory 
in order to better elucidate its relation to modern populism—a concept that 
 
 62. Ackerman frames this point by suggesting that his democratic dualism seeks a “third way” 
between “legalistic perfection” and the “lawless force” of populist usurpation. ACKERMAN, supra note 
13, at 33, 116. 
 63. See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 174 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)). 
 64. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 93–95. 
 65. Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. After highlighting this requirement of protracted dominion in property law, Ackerman 
continues:  
So too in constitutional law. Popular sovereignty cannot be won in a single moment. As at 
the Founding, a rising reform movement must engage in a temporally extended process—
in which it is obliged to defend its claims to speak for the People time and again in a series 
of escalating institutional contests for public support. 
Id. 
 68. To be more precise, these questions will be discussed at the end of Section II of this  
Article, on the idea of court-packing as a move to consolidate a nearly complete constitutional moment 
(“Option One: Court-Packing as a Move to Consolidate a Constitutional Moment?”). See infra  
pp.48-54. 
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I have thus far left lurking in the shadows. At the risk of 
oversimplification, one can arguably distil modern populism down to two 
core theses: (1) that the will of the people is superior to all law, including 
constitutional law,69 and (2) that the will of the people can be adequately 
represented—and is in fact best represented—by a single actor or 
institution that authentically embodies the people’s spirit at a given point 
in time (Andrew Arato refers to this thesis using the term “organ 
sovereignty”70). While Ackerman evidently accepts the first thesis, he just 
as evidently rejects the second thesis, breaking the link between his theory 
and populism by insisting that the pathway to popular sovereignty is not 
through direct embodiment (or as he puts it, through allowing a single 
institution to “transubstantiate itself into the People”71), but through the 
effective operation of the federal separation of powers across a 
generation.72 In effect, this provides us with the prospect of something like 
a “third way,”73 between legalism and populism; between “legalistic 
nitpicking”74 (legitimate constitutional change can only take place via 
Article V) and “lawless force”75 (constitutional law means nothing in the 
face of contrary public opinion). To put this differently and perhaps more 
clearly, one could say that the promise of popular sovereignty is defended 
in Ackerman’s work against two opposing threats: (1) the threat of the 
“bicentennial myth,”76 which denies that Americans have meaningfully 
reinvented their constitutional identity since the 1780s, thereby confining 
the American experience of popular sovereignty and political freedom to 
the very distant past, and (2) the threat of the populist demagogue who 
claims that their solid electoral mandate justifies all manner of 
 
 69. Schmitt’s distinction between the “absolute” and “relative” conceptions of a constitution is 
an important example of this, SCHMITT, supra note 10, but Ackerman finds more palatable support 
from the American founders, including in Alexander Hamilton’s claim in Federalist No. 78 that the 
“power of the people is superior to” the power of government, see Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs 
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1013 (1984). 
 70. ARATO, supra note 16, at 23. 
 71. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 182. 
 72. Andrew Arato has offered a very different reading of Ackerman, suggesting that Ackerman’s 
theory only emphasizes the separation of powers during periods of normal politics, not during periods 
of constitutional politics when the People themselves begin to speak. While there is a certain amount 
of rhetoric in Ackerman’s work that supports this reading, it is undercut, I would argue, by Ackerman’s 
explicit claims that it is a reform movement’s slow passage through the American separation of powers 
that will eventually vindicate its bold claims to speak for the People. As Ackerman writes in The Civil 
Rights Revolution, for example, a reform movement must “undertake an arduous march through the 
presidency, Congress, and the Court before it can legitimately enact sweeping changes.” See 
Ackerman, supra note 31, at 43. For Arato’s analysis, see ARATO, supra note 16, at 108. 
 73. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 33. 
 74. See Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63, 86 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 75. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 116. 
 76. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 34. 
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constitutional novelty. In response to these opposing threats, Ackerman 
gives us a fascinating and auspicious hybrid: namely, the idea that the 
sovereign People should be regarded as speaking when a majority of the 
voting population keeps speaking, and keeps lending its support for  
the same initiative over a sustained period of time and after a rich sequence 
of highly public debates. The question now on the table is: how does  
the prospect of court-packing generally and, in 2021 in particular, look 
when viewed through the lens of Ackerman’s hybrid theory of 
constitutional change? 
II. OPTION ONE: COURT-PACKING AS A MOVE TO CONSOLIDATE A 
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT? 
Having cast our eyes back over Ackerman’s constitutional theory, 
then, let us turn back to the matter at hand by asking whether that theory 
allows court-packing to be treated as a democratically defensible pathway 
to systemic change. While Ackerman does not offer an unequivocal 
answer to this question, his thoughtful engagement with President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) infamous court-packing plan in Volume II of 
We the People provides some important clues on his thinking, and will 
accordingly serve as a useful starting point in framing Ackerman’s 
perspective on court-packing as a road to constitutional amendment 
outside Article V.77 Without delving too deep into the well-worn story of 
the FDR plan,78 suffice it to say here that the plan came within sight of 
fruition when Roosevelt won his second presidential election in 1936, 
when he maintained his office with one of the most decisive, sweeping 
mandates in American history.79 From the outset, this already tells us 
 
 77. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 312–44. 
 78. On this story, see also JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE 
SUPREME COURT (2011), and William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
“Court-Packing” Plan, SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1966). 
 79. This is an understatement. As Ackerman explained in an earlier law review article, what 
distinguishes FDR and the New Deal Democrats from subsequent reformers (like Reagan’s 
Republicans) is the way that the former continued to accumulate support with each election, 
culminating in their blunt obliteration of the opposition in 1936. To quote Ackerman on this:  
Before Franklin Roosevelt gained the Senate’s advice and consent to transformative 
appointments, he did more than simply win reelection. Most obviously, he led the 
Democratic Party to a remarkable series of electoral victories in Congress. Looking 
narrowly at the Senate, the difference between the Roosevelt and Reagan years does not 
show up so dramatically on the day each President first took possession of the White 
House: in both 1932 and 1980, the President’s party took control of the Senate for the first 
time in many years (fourteen years in the case of the Democrats, twenty-six in the case of 
the Republicans). The key difference is that Roosevelt succeeded, and Reagan failed, to 
build on this initial success. During Reagan’s first six years, Republican support in the 
Senate remained in the low 50’s, and finally sank to minority status in 1986, despite the 
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something crucial about how to read Ackerman’s views on the FDR plan, 
because if Ackerman is anything less than resounding in his recognition 
of FDR’s democratic authority to pack the Supreme Court after  
a second, crushing electoral victory (and as we will see, he is far  
from resounding on this count), then does it not seem that from his 
perspective, court-packing is a governmental option to be justified 
extremely hesitantly, if ever? 
Keeping this thought closely in mind, we can pick up the story by 
recalling that although FDR’s plan suffered a massive defeat at the hands 
of an otherwise friendly80 Congress, it is also seen as having provoked the 
Supreme Court’s repudiation of the Lochner era81 in West Coast Hotel, the 
infamous “switch in time that saved nine”82 and that ended the Supreme 
Court’s long, bitter resistance to the New Deal. How does Ackerman view 
this chain of events? The first thing to note is that, on his reading, the 
switch occurred toward the tail end of a period of intense constitutional 
politics, after the constitutional philosophy of the New Deal had already 
cleared an impressive succession of electoral hurdles and was for 
Ackerman on the brink of yielding a completed constitutional moment. In 
this regard, one may initially suppose that by 1937, the Supreme Court 
was increasingly unjustified, from a dualist point of view, in its 
institutional resistance. Did the increasing gulf between enduring public 
opinion and the Supreme Court’s Lochner jurisprudence give Roosevelt a 
right to use a tactic as contentious and drastic as court-packing to 
constitutionally entrench the New Deal? 
Not quite, as it turns out. Or at least, things are not as simple as saying 
in advance that court-packing is simply right or wrong, legitimate or 
illegitimate, thinkable or unthinkable. On the contrary, for Ackerman, the 
thinker of the constituent power in modern America,83 everything hinges 
on how ordinary Americans, the distinctive “heroes”84 of Ackerman’s 
 
President’s warning about the fate of future Supreme Court nominees. In contrast, the New 
Deal Democrats kept building their representation to unprecedented heights during the next 
two elections—so that, after their landslide victory of 1936, there were no fewer than 
seventy-six Democrats in the Senate. 
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1173. 
 80. As noted in the footnote above, “there were no fewer than seventy-six Democrats in the 
Senate” when FDR put forward his court-packing plan. Id. 
 81. For an especially interesting and thoughtful analysis of the Lochner-era and its modern-day 
descendants, see Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); see also Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 82. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
69, 69 (2010); see also KENT ROACH: THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR 
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE? 19 (2001). 
 83. As an example of this claim, see Andrew Arato, Carl Schmitt and the Revival of the Doctrine 
of the Constituent Power in the United States, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2000). 
 84. See Christodoulidis, supra note 29, at 969. 
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theory, would have responded to court-packing if it had been successfully 
implemented. In this sense, while a large majority of Americans went with 
Roosevelt in 1936 despite being warned that court-packing could be on the 
horizon (e.g., by FDR’s opponent, Alf Landon85), this does not tell us how 
voters would have reacted to court-packing as a definitive occurrence 
rather than an uncertain prospect. Indeed, when the Supreme Court 
eventually undertook its famous switch in time, it effectively “killed”86 
what Ackerman refers to as a “remarkably sophisticated constitutional 
debate”87 over whether “unconventional steps like court-packing”88 would 
suffice to enact decisive constitutional change or whether reformists 
would ultimately need to take a much longer and more precarious walk 
home through Article V. What a shame, Ackerman seems to sigh, that we 
will never know how voters would have responded to and weighed in on 
this debate.89 This is especially so insofar as early Gallup polling suggested 
that public opinion was swinging in Roosevelt’s favor before the switch, 
although it was still very much on a knife edge (as Ackerman says, “on the 
eve of the Court’s ‘switch,’ Gallup was reporting a close division of 
opinion”90). Would “continued judicial resistance . . . have played into [the 
President’s] hands, allowing him to present court-packing as the only 
practical solution”91 to the problem of a staunchly “intransigent”92 and 
unpopular Supreme Court? 
We need not answer this question. On the contrary, the most 
important question for the purposes of this Article is one that I have 
already answered: the question of whether court-packing could have been 
a democratically acceptable means of consolidating the constitutional 
transformations of the New Deal. Ackerman’s answer to this question, as 
we have seen, is that it would have depended on how the American public 
weighed in on Roosevelt’s legacy at the next election, after the President 
had successfully pushed his packing plan through Congress. Without 
overstating things, then, Ackerman’s emphasis on popular sovereignty as 
a redemptive force renders court-packing ultimately thinkable, but 
conditionally so, where ordinary voters actually show their clear support 
for its executors via electoral politics. This is why I suggested above that 
court-packing is not simply right or wrong, legitimate or illegitimate, 
thinkable or unthinkable. To put it simply, the legitimacy of court-packing 
 
 85. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 310. 
 86. Id. at 315. 
 87. Id. at 314. 
 88. Id. at 315. 
 89. Id. at 314–15. 
 90. Id. at 333. 
 91. Id. at 335. 
 92. Id. 
2020] Court-Packing in 2021 51 
and of similar practices is, in Ackerman’s view, a question of political 
history, of how the country happens to sway in the winds of opposing 
constitutional arguments and extraordinary institutional actions. 
To flash forward to the impending future, does this mean that  
court-packing in 2021 could be retroactively legitimated if it were 
followed, say, by a Democratic landslide in the 2022 midterms and by 
even more landslides further down the road? The answer to this question 
ultimately depends on how we read Ackerman. On one reading, it may 
seem that Ackerman’s theory withholds judgment from early efforts to 
represent a People (acts of “creative statesmanship”93), and allows all such 
efforts to be validated or invalidated by public opinion over time, even if 
they are rightly questionable and hence contestable when they initially 
take place. However, a much better reading, I think, would take account 
of Ackerman’s comments on another democratically questionable 
strategy, the use of the ordinary judicial appointments process to radically 
and quickly transform constitutional law (à la FDR after the failure of his 
packing plan). On this tactic, Ackerman argues fervently in the closing 
pages of We the People: Transformations that later Presidents should—
for reasons of political strategy94 as well as reasons of dualistic political 
morality—be far more cautious than FDR when appointing new justices, 
assuming that subsequent presidents (especially in these times of extreme 
political polarization95) will lack the type of mandate that FDR had when 
he made his boldest appointments to the court.96 To quote one of the key 
passages in this section: 
Nonetheless, the New Deal precedent . . . [of transformative 
appointments following the failure of court-packing] . . . may be 
abused by future Presidents with far more equivocal mandates than 
Roosevelt’s. After all, each President’s power to influence the Court 
depends on the vagaries of death and resignation. A significant 
number of vacancies may open up during the term(s) of an 
ideological President who lacks broad and deep support. Given the 
ease with which Senatorial confirmation battles can obscure the 
 
 93. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 44. 
 94. For Ackerman, there is a high risk that “interbranch struggle” over a contentious judicial 
appointment may “only reveal the shallowness of . . . [the President’s public and Congressional] 
support.” ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 395. 
 95. See Divided America, ASSOCIATED PRESS, https://www.ap.org/explore/divided-america/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/V4LX-KJFN]. 
 96. To quote Ackerman: 
Most Presidents do not come into office with a mandate for fundamental change of the kind 
that Franklin Delano Roosevelt plausibly claimed in the aftermath of the elections of 
1936 . . . If the American people were ever endorsing a break with their constitutional past, 
they were doing so in the 1930’s. 
ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 53. 
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underlying issues, it is just too easy for randomly selected Presidents 
to revolutionize constitutional law without the kind of popular 
support required in dualist theory.97 
The message here is quite clear, but Ackerman was even clearer in a 
1988 law review article on the idea of “transformative”98 judicial 
appointments. In that piece, Ackerman suggested that the use of the 
appointments process to transform the Supreme Court is actually a “bad 
thing,”99 even if it has some advantages over the Article V process and 
even if there is in reality “no going back to the good old days when 
[A]rticle V provided the only means by which Americans debated changes 
in their constitutional destiny.”100 This does not mean that Roosevelt was 
overreaching when he eventually “packed”101 the Court via the 
appointments process (Ackerman’s inclusion of the New Deal as a 
legitimate constitutional moment makes this crystal clear102); just that the 
appointments process does not have checks baked into it that would 
prevent a President with a much thinner mandate from seizing the court in 
a relatively short space of time and, from speaking for the People before 
their full, constitutional will has materialized (before the People have 
appeared, one might even say103). 
It is hard to miss the parallels between these moments of warning 
from Ackerman and the current situation in the United States, where 
happenstance has indeed given a President who lost the popular vote by a 
significant margin two very consequential Supreme Court picks in his first 
term. Putting these parallels to one side, the deeper implication for present 
purposes is that while sustained popularity across a generation can serve 
to validate, vindicate, or “perfect”104 controversial tactics retroactively (or 
as Publius put it, to “blot out . . . irregularities”105) from a dualist 
perspective, Ackerman also seems to believe that there are limits—albeit 
effervescent, uncertain and context-sensitive ones—with respect to when 
 
 97. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 405. 
 98. See Ackerman, supra note 11. 
 99. Id. at 1179. 
 100. Id. 
 101. I do not mean to suggest here that this method of packing is the same, morally, as passing 
a law that enlarges the court and transforms it in one fell swoop. On the contrary, as FDR’s 
Congressional opponents—in his own party—made clear, there is something far less problematic and 
altogether more “orderly” about piecemeal, incremental packing through the appointments process, 
presumably since it provides opportunities for opposition movements to interrupt a transformative 
President’s progress. Id. at 1176. 
 102. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 105–30. 
 103. One may well say this under Ackerman’s influence. As he puts it in the first volume of We 
the People, under normal political conditions (as opposed to periods of constitutional politics), “the 
People simply do not exist.” Id. at 263. 
 104. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 93. 
 105. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 174. 
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certain tactics can be used. In effect, the overarching rule from which such 
limits can be derived is that bolder, more morally or legally dubious tactics 
should be reserved for the closing phases of an unfolding constitutional 
moment, when the public has already given support for an initiative 
repeatedly but are still seeing their emergent and almost fully emerged 
voice thwarted by a group of constitutionally conservative institutions that 
did not get the memo. In this sense, rather than viewing Ackerman’s theory 
as one that grants legitimacy only in hindsight, one may view it as turning 
on something like a “two-tiered”106 legitimacy test that requires first that 
there is a strong measure of proportionality between the boldness of the 
tactic used and the progress of the constitutional moment and, second, that 
all tactics used by reformers are validated by the repeated expressions of 
public support required to constitute a full-fledged constitutional moment. 
III. OPTION TWO: COURT-PACKING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNAL? 
So, this is how Ackerman discusses the most famous and infamous 
episode of attempted court-packing in American history. While this 
analysis can surely help us understand Ackerman’s general perspective on 
the political morality of court-packing, FDR’s position was strikingly 
different from the position that a Democratic President might hope to find 
themselves in come 2021, not least of all because there is no Democratic 
constitutional moment currently underway to be consolidated and because 
the chances of a Democratic landslide are grievously slim (America is now 
 
 106. In effect, my proposal here comes close to but modifies the following test attributed to 
Ackerman in an I-CONnect blog entry: 
Ackerman accepts the legitimacy of popular, extra-legal changes to constitutional law, but 
in a very precise, non-populist way that gives rise to a two-tiered legitimacy test. To 
explain: when the use of formal amendment procedures is problematic, it is presumed that 
political and legal actors may legitimately act outside of or stretch pre-existing laws to 
publicize an emergent movement to reorient national values (as the Warren Court did, for 
example, with its Brown decision). At one level, Ackerman’s theory regards such action as 
legitimate, since it promotes republican debate over national values (essential for the 
production of constitutional moments). However, at another level, Ackerman’s theory also 
regards such action as illegitimate—or rather, as not-yet-legitimate—because responsible 
actors can not yet claim to be acting in the name of “the people,” only in the name of a 
budding popular will that they aim, precisely, to let/make bloom. 
Richard Mailey, Weak-Form Judicial Review as a Way of Legally Facilitating Constitutional 
Moments?, INT’L J. CONST. L. I-CONNECT BLOG (Feb. 22, 2018) (emphasis added), http://www. 
iconnectblog.com/2018/02/weak-form-judicial-review-as-a-way-of-legally-facilitating-constitutional 
-moments/ [https://perma.cc/4DPC-LPEN]. My modification to this formulation is that I do not 
believe that all legally or morally questionable acts are equal when it comes to meeting the first tier of 
the test. Rather, my sense is that there is a proportionality component in Ackerman’s thinking, which 
allows for bolder and more controversial action the closer a constitutional moment is to completion—
especially where recalcitrant conservative branches are digging their heels in despite an enduring 
public appetite for change. 
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too polarized for a landslide in any direction107). This leaves us to ask, in 
the remainder of the Article: is there anything more specific that 
Ackerman’s theory suggests about the potential legitimacy of court-
packing in 2021? Are Democrats doomed to wait until they have 
repeatedly claimed FDR-level mandates before considering an option like 
court-packing? In other words, from the perspective of Ackerman’s 
dualism, would a popular succession of Democratic governments have to 
watch more or less passively, and haplessly, while their boldest (and from 
their perspective most essential) legal reforms get scuppered by an 
arguably108 illegitimate Supreme Court for years to come? 
In the next two sections, I will move us closer to answering these 
questions by considering two ways in which court-packing might yet be 
defended in 2021 using Ackerman’s model of constitutional amendment. 
To begin with, in this section, I will consider whether court-packing in 
2021 could be framed as what Ackerman calls a constitutional signal. As 
already noted, a constitutional signal is the first, initiating step in 
Ackerman’s “alternative signaling system”109 of constitutional 
amendment, where an institution of the federal government translates the 
pleas of a social movement for constitutional transformation into a 
deliberately contra-constitutional act, e.g., a law that cuts clearly against 
the “constitutional status quo.”110 While the third volume of Ackerman’s 
We the People trilogy suggests that this act can come from any branch of 
government, including the Supreme Court, I will focus my attention here 
on the executive-led approach that appears in the first volume of We the 
People and which Ackerman has affirmed as recently as 2014.111 
As presented in We the People’s first volume, Ackerman’s signaling 
test proposes that an ideal constitutional signal will possess three key 
characteristics. First, it will be issued by a “plebiscitarian”112 leader who 
can plausibly “claim a mandate from the People.”113 Second, it will be 
legally solidified by being submitted to and approved by Congress in the 
 
 107. See, e.g., Divided America, supra note 95. 
 108. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4. 
 109. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 278. 
 110. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 418. 
 111. For Ackerman’s recent affirmation of this test, see Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling 
Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 3110 (2014). 
 112. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 83. 
 113. Id. at 268. Although Ackerman uses the term “People” with a capital P here, I would suggest 
that his theory disallows such claims in the early phases of the higher lawmaking process. As he puts 
it, “no institution of normal politics can be allowed to transubstantiate itself into the People.” Id. at 
182. This suggests that what Ackerman really means to say here, when he suggests that the President 
must have a mandate from the People, is that the President should have a mandate from the electorate, 
or the population of voters. To say any more than this in the signaling phase is surely to rely on the 
type of “naive synecdoche” that Ackerman rejects when he formulates his dialogic, protracted model 
for recognizing acts of popular sovereignty. Id. at 183. 
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form of a “transformative statute that challenge[s] . . . the fundamentals of 
the preexisting regime.”114 And third, the reform initiative itself will  
have a level of public support, over and above the President’s personal 
mandate, that is “extraordinary in three senses: depth, breadth,  
and decisiveness.”115 While the first two of these three requirements are 
straightforward, the third requirement is more complex and merits distinct 
consideration. What, then, does Ackerman mean by deep, broad, and 
decisive public support? 
Beginning with depth, Ackerman suggests that a reform initiative 
will have deep support when a supportive individual has “deliberated as 
much about her commitment to . . . [it] as she thinks appropriate in making 
a considered judgment on an important decision in her private life.”116 
Although it is surely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the extent of 
such support across a large population, Ackerman nonetheless opts to put 
a loose figure on this requirement by suggesting that a legitimate 
constitutional signal must possess the deep support of around 20% of  
the voting population.117 The conditions of breadth and decisiveness  
then require, respectively, that an additional 31% of the population support 
the relevant initiative on less considered but basically non-selfish grounds 
(as Ackerman puts it, “numbers count”118), and that the initiative is  
“in a position to defeat all the plausible alternatives in a series of  
pairwise comparisons.”119 
Taken together, these requirements seem to place some rather steep 
limits on an initiative’s admission to what Ackerman calls the “higher 
lawmaking”120 track. For several reasons, though, Ackerman suggests that 
the requirements should not be applied too stringently. The first reason for 
this suggestion is that Ackerman supposes that little harm will be done by 
accepting the legitimacy of an under supported signal, given that such a 
signal will be highly unlikely to “survive the obstacle course that awaits 
on the higher lawmaking track (though of course, nothing is certain in 
politics).”121 Second, Ackerman suggests that imposing overly strict limits 
on acts of signaling will risk “betray[ing] . . . the Constitution’s 
 
 114. Id. at 268. I should note that Ackerman technically places this step in the subsequent 
“proposal” phase of a constitutional moment, but the two phases—signaling and proposing—are 
sufficiently intertwined, I think, to justify its inclusion here as a key aspect of constitutional signaling.  
 115. Id. at 272. 
 116. Id. at 274. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 277. 
 120. The higher lawmaking track is the sequence of tests that an initiative must pass to be 
counted as a constitutional amendment outside Article V under Ackerman’s theory (i.e., as a 
constitutional moment). Id. 
 121. Id. at 280. 
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foundational commitment to popular sovereignty”122 by depriving citizens 
of the opportunity to reconsider, “on appropriate occasions”123 and in ever-
changing ways, the terms of their constitutional co-existence (his broader 
argument is of course that this is what Article V has problematically 
tended to do). “Worse yet,” Ackerman writes: 
[blocking reform movements too quickly] . . . will alienate the 
movement’s many partisans from the ongoing process of 
government. These people will not passively accept the fact that the 
door to higher lawmaking has been slammed in their face. If existing 
institutions refuse to hear the voice of the People, they will be 
tempted to take more radical steps to gain the center of the political 
stage—abandoning entirely the higher lawmaking structures 
intended to organize the debate and seeking more violent and elitist 
forms of fundamental change.124 
This passage comes at the end of the section of Ackerman’s first We 
the People book on constitutional signaling, and it may leave one 
wondering if the requirement of deep, broad, and decisive support is more 
a flexible preference for Ackerman than a rule. Does this suggest that 
Supreme Court expansion could, from an Ackermanian perspective, be 
defensibly undertaken in 2021 by a supportive President and Congress if 
it had a mere preponderance of public support (or at least a bit less public 
support than the “extraordinary”125 levels preferred by Ackerman)? To 
begin addressing this question, recall that the core justification for 
Ackerman’s alternative lawmaking system is that it is distinguishable from 
“demagogic lawlessness and populism”126 even though it involves 
bypassing legal norms in the name of popular sovereignty (a populist 
gesture, par excellence). To achieve this distinction, the Ackermanian 
alternative lawmaking system relies heavily on what Claude Lefort calls 
the “institutionalization of conflict.”127 The President issues a 
constitutional signal, but the layered structure of the American system 
leaves ample room for other institutions and actors (e.g., the Supreme 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 191. “[A] constitutional road to the people, ought to be marked out, and kept open, 
for certain great and extraordinary occasions.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 126. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (2011). 
 127. Claude Lefort, The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?, in POLITICAL THEOLOGIES: 
PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN A POST-SECULAR WORLD 160–61 (Hent De Vries & Lawrence E. Sullivan eds., 
2006). 
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Court) to strike back by defending a more “conservative”128 constitutional 
vision. The problem is, court-packing does not allow for this conflictual, 
Lefortian dynamic. On the contrary, the decisive function (if not the 
purpose) of court-packing in 2021 would be precisely to remove the final 
bastion of institutional resistance to Democratic reform, thereby 
homogenizing the upper echelons of the federal government or, at the very 
least, watering down the Supreme Court’s capacity to present a 
conservative alternative to a budding Democratic reform movement.129 
A Democrat might respond to this argument by noting that while 
court-packing (or expansion) would certainly change the likelihood that 
the Supreme Court would pose a meaningful challenge to the 
transformative impulses of a Democratic government, it would leave 
another key site of resistance, the Republican Party, untouched and ready 
to fight back at the next election. Of course, in a very broad sense, the 
potential for Republican resistance does interrupt the monologic, anti-
Lefortian thrust of court-packing, because if court-packing was pursued in 
a new administration’s first term, it would likely only come to pass within 
sight of the midterm elections, thereby giving voters an opportunity to 
promptly penalize Democrats if they perceive overreach, or if they 
otherwise reject their governmental vision. However, while electoral 
politics is an important aspect of the Ackermanian model, the rather more 
decisive, legitimating dynamic is the inter-institutional one at the federal 
level. Indeed, according to Ackerman, it is precisely this dynamic that sets 
the dualism of the American system most sharply against the “levelling 
democracy”130 or “monism”131 of the UK, “where a single election can 
indeed generate dramatic changes.”132 In this sense, the crucial point for 
Ackerman is that a scheme of tectonic change in America should not just 
be tested by its proponents’ reelection prospects but by a meaningfully 
robust separation of powers as well, i.e., by the need for reformers to 
“undertake an arduous march through the presidency, Congress, and the 
 
 128. As Ackerman explains in relation to the Supreme Court’s role during the New Deal, for 
example: “[T]he Supreme Court [during the New Deal] was contributing to the American people’s 
political education by presenting a rich constitutional critique revealing the extent to which the New 
Deal’s innovations could be seen as departing from our nation’s traditional political principles.” 
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1174. 
 129. See Arato, supra note 1. 
 130. To quote Ackerman on the notion of “levelling” democracy: “In this single-track view, 
there is only one place in which the political will of the American people is to be found: the Congress 
of the United States. If the Congress enacts a law, the People have spoken; if not, not. It’s that simple 
. . . .” Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1035–37 (1984). 
 131. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 
464 (1989). 
 132. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 43. 
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Court,”133 before their initiative can finally be admitted to the country’s 
constitutional canon. 
To be clear, though, none of these arguments negate the potential 
legitimacy of a Democratic constitutional signal in 2021 along other lines. 
From an Ackermanian perspective, a successful signal and proposal could 
be issued, depending on the level and quality of public support for it, in 
the form of a statute that consciously contravenes and challenges previous 
Supreme Court rulings on critical issues like campaign finance (Citizens 
United134) or gun control (Heller135).136 However, for Ackerman, the value 
of such moves is not that they would necessarily facilitate positive 
constitutional reform but that they would provoke national and inter-
institutional dialogue on the relevant issues, thereby creating a space for 
ordinary Americans—the distinctive deciders within Ackerman’s 
theory—to ultimately determine over the course of the next generation if 
the time for change has arrived. While it may be tempting for Democrats 
to avoid this “arduous”137 and precariously uncertain process of 
consensus-building, Ackerman’s theory regards such a process as non-
negotiable where the informal amendment track is being used, and for 
good reasons. Above all, the most important reason for this requirement is 
that the key role of the federal separation of powers as a way to 
“stagger”138 reform processes is really the most significant factor (as noted 
in Section I) that separates Ackerman from populist constitutionalists like 
Carl Schmitt139 as well as from the authoritarian populism of Poland’s 
court-packing Law and Justice Party. In the end, everything—all the 
institutionalist, dialogic, non-populist legitimacy that Ackerman’s  
theory claims to capture—hinges on the strength of this distinction, and  
on the extent to which Ackerman joins the likes of Claude Lefort rather 
than the likes of Schmitt. The problem is that for the reasons  
just mentioned, one cannot sustain this distinction while casting court-
packing as a constitutional signal. This realization leads us now to our third 
and final opportunity to stage an Ackermanian defense of court-packing 
in the next section. 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 135. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 136. For a comprehensive survey of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence, see LAURENCE TRIBE & 
JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014). 
 137. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 43. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See generally SCHMITT, supra note 10. 
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IV. OPTION THREE: COURT-PACKING AS AN EXPRESSION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM? 
So, court-packing in 2021 is hard to frame as a constitutional signal 
under Ackerman’s theory. Is there another way of framing it, though, that 
would more decisively separate the Democrats from authoritarian populist 
court-packers like the Law and Justice Party in Poland140 and populist 
constitutional theorists like Carl Schmitt141? In this Section, I will offer an 
affirmative answer to this question by casting Democrats in a completely 
new (and extremely limited) constitutional role, namely, the role of 
constitutional conservatives rather than reformers. In its most distilled 
form, the essence of this argument is that even if a single set of electoral 
wins would not give Democrats anything like a mandate to begin exacting 
constitutional change via transformative court-packing (or even via  
the appointments process142) in 2021, it would give Democrats a 
mandate—and a constitutional obligation, one may even argue—to 
swiftly and decisively curb the transformative agenda that is currently 
being pursued by Republicans via eminently controversial uses of the 
appointments process. 
In making this argument, I will address two key questions. Firstly, 
on what precise Ackermanian grounds could Democrats challenge the 
transformative efforts of the Republican party? And secondly, what kind 
of court-packing or reform initiative would this challenge permit or 
require? Beginning with the first question, the crucial point is that 
Ackerman’s theory requires that constitutional reform attempts outside 
Article V enjoy the consistent support of ordinary Americans across a full 
generation—with no major breaks or hiccups.143 In this regard, while a 
Democratic President and Congress may well believe that the current 
President’s failure to win the popular vote in 2016 delegitimated his 
scheme of transformative judicial appointments from the outset, their main 
 
 140. See Sadurski, supra note 2. 
 141. See generally SCHMITT, supra note 10. 
 142. There is an important distinction to be made here between ordinary and transformative uses 
of the appointments process. In a 1988 law review article on the idea of “transformative 
appointments,” Ackerman compares two Reagan appointments: Bork and O’Connor. Ackerman, 
supra note 11. Of these two, only Bork—who of course was not confirmed—counts for Ackerman as 
a transformative appointment, partly because of his intellectual prowess (and his related potential to 
lead the right wing of the court across a generation), partly because of his comparatively extreme 
views (by contrast, O’Connor was a moderate with conservative leanings), and partly because his 
views were so clearly documented (hence acting as a “signal” to the country of what a Justice Bork 
would look like in practice). See id. at 1169–70. 
 143. Note, for example, that one of the crucial differences that Ackerman stresses between the 
transformative efforts of FDR and Reagan is that unlike FDR, Reagan failed to build on his initial 
success by winning more commanding electoral victories or, at the very least, by maintaining control 
of Congress. See id. at 1173. 
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Ackermanian argument as constitutional conservatives would be that any 
mandate that the Republicans may or may not have had to pursue 
constitutional transformation post-2016 would have then been decisively 
terminated by their failure to win critical elections in 2020. 
From the outset, it is worth noting that this argument has the 
debatable benefit of bypassing a range of divisive issues, including, for 
example, the controversial appointment of Brett Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court.144 To explain this point, while the current President’s 
mandate (or lack thereof) poses a significant problem for the dualistic 
legitimacy of Justice Kavanaugh’s nomination, dualism is less directly 
concerned with either the allegations surrounding Justice Kavanaugh’s 
past conduct or the conspiratorial rhetoric of his confirmation hearings.145 
Of course, these factors are gravely and rightly important from a broader 
political and moral perspective, but recall that we are confining ourselves 
for now to an engagement with Ackerman’s dualist theory of 
constitutional transformation, and recall further that this theory allows 
enduring and dialogically tested public support for constitutional change 
to “blot out”146 or “perfect”147 defects in the amendment process. The 
question is: could the problematic appointment of Justice Kavanaugh be 
counted as a potentially excusable defect in the Republicans’ quest for 
constitutional change, i.e., excusable by an eventual manifestation of 
popular sovereignty in the Republicans’ favor? In lieu of a simple answer 
to this question, suffice it to say that although more dubious or aggressive 
tactics should be deployed later in the amendment process under 
Ackerman’s model, Ackerman’s emphasis on the redemptive force of 
popular sovereignty suggests quite clearly that a backward-looking 
approach—one that re-litigates the Kavanaugh affair—is not most 
effective Ackermanian argument for conservative or defensive court-
packing. On the contrary, if the Democrats win big in 2020, their principal 
Ackermanian argument would be that Republican reformists had been 
democratically repudiated and should have their constitutional gains 
reversed via “remedial” changes to the Supreme Court. To paraphrase 
none other than President Trump on this point, one could say that, from an 
 
 144. On the Kavanaugh hearings and the various controversies surrounding them, see generally 
Tribe, supra note 6. See also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 159–60. 
 145. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 158–60. 
 146. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 174 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)). 
 147. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 93. As noted previously, here Ackerman analogizes  
an adverse possessor—who perfects his initially poor title to land by complying with certain  
legal conditions over time—to a constitutional reform movement aiming to bring about a  
constitutional moment. 
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Ackermanian perspective, the “only important thing is the . . . people,”148 
and it is the people—and not just those who are understandably appalled 
by Kavanaugh’s confirmation149—who must choose whether to finally and 
firmly reject the Republicans’ transformative constitutional vision. 
As narrow as this argument might seem, there are still a lot of 
variables on which its success depends. In particular, the success of this 
argument hinges on how fully Democrats would be willing to invest 
themselves in the Ackermanian role of constitutional conservatives, which 
would depend, in turn, on the specific contours of their court reform 
package and on the aggressiveness with which they would pursue 
nationally controversial elements of their political agenda. To make this 
point clearer, let us very briefly consider each of these two factors in turn, 
starting with the court reform package itself. 
What kind of reform (or “packing”) package would allow the 
Democrats to cast themselves as constitutional conservatives? The easy 
but negative answer to this is of course that the Democrats could not do 
anything that could be reasonably mistaken for stacking the deck in their 
favor, but this answer simply leaves us to ask again: what could they do? 
One of the most interesting answers to this question has come from 
presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg, whose “Balanced Bench”150 
proposal is based on a recent article in the Yale Law Journal.151 To quote 
an explanatory passage from that article: 
The . . . [Balanced Bench] proposal has several components. First, 
the Supreme Court would start with ten justices. Five would be 
affiliated with the Democratic Party, and five with the Republican 
Party. These ten justices would then select five additional Justices 
chosen from current circuit (or possibly district) court judges. The 
catch? The ten partisan-affiliated Justices would need to select the 
additional five Justices unanimously (or at least a strong 
supermajority requirement). These additional five Justices would be 
chosen two years in advance, for one-year terms. And if the Justices 
 
 148. See MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 22. As Müller points out, though, the current President has a 
very different understanding of what constitutes a “people,” as evidenced by the full quote that I have 
paraphrased above: “[T]he only important thing is the unification of the people—because the other 
people don’t mean anything.” Id. As this quote suggests, the President, and populists generally, has 
little or no interest in social groups and individuals that cannot be brought to share their moral and 
political vision (i.e., that cannot be “unified” behind that vision). See id. 
 149. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 6; see also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4. 
 150. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 193–205. While Epps and Sitaraman offer a second 
proposal on “how to save the Supreme Court” (“the Supreme Court Lottery”), I am only considering 
the “Balanced Bench” plan because it was the plan that was originally embraced by Buttigieg and that, 
according to the Mother Jones article cited earlier, brought court-packing onto the table as a serious 
option for the Democrats if they win big enough in 2020. See Levy, supra note 3. 
 151. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4. 
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failed to agree on a slate of additional colleagues, the Supreme Court 
would lack a quorum and could not hear any cases for that year.152 
On its face, this plan evidently aspires to attain an ideological 
equilibrium on the Supreme Court, and this arguably renders it more 
plausible as a public-regarding, non-partisan project, i.e., as a 
constitutionally conservative project of the type considered here. 
However, there are troubling questions (in what way would justices be 
“partisan-affiliated”?153) as well as constitutional objections (e.g., relying 
on the Appointments Clause154) that could be thrown at such a plan, as 
recognized by the plan’s authors and as raised, more forcefully, by various 
others.155 Curiously, to the extent that these objections hold water, it seems 
that while partisan and indeed populist court-packing is constitutionally 
sound and legal, Buttigieg’s sincere proposal to balance the Supreme 
Court may require an Article V amendment (as would equally admirable 
efforts to limit the power of the Court156). These constitutional 
 
 152. Id. at 193. 
 153. See Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, Why Pete Buttigieg Is Wrong About the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/opinion/buttigieg-warren-supreme-
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note 4. 
 154. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 200–05. Epps and Sitaraman have recently offered 
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Constitutionality of the 5-5-5 Plan, TAKE CARE BLOG (May 17, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog 
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and socially. 
 155. See Aaron Belkin, 5-5-5 and Appellate Rotation Plans Are Unconstitutional and 
Unworkable, TAKE BACK THE COURT (Mar. 2019), https://www.takebackthecourt.today/5-5-5-and-
appellate-rotation-plans-are-unconstitutional-and-unworkable [https://perma.cc/Z9J5-U4KJ]; see also 
Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A Response to Epps and Sitaraman, 129 YALE 
L.J.F. 93 (2019), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/supreme-court-as-superweapon [https:// 
perma.cc/27LK-TJS2]. 
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implications create a potent problem for the Buttigieg plan and other 
similarly creative or unconventional plans. Assuming that Article V is not 
an option (and current divisions suggest that it is probably not), one is left 
wondering if the idea would be to try get the plan through Congress despite 
credible claims of constitutional infirmity, thereby damaging the 
Democrats’ self-presentation as constitutional conservatives and 
potentially also precipitating a constitutional crisis by leaving the Supreme 
Court to decide whether to block or permit its own reform. Is there a way 
out of this impasse, a way forward that does not raise constitutional red 
flags or look like partisan court-packing, both of which would erode the 
Democrats’ claims of constitutional conservatism? 
A perhaps disappointing way around this problem could be for 
Democrats to couple a modest form of court-packing—“court-balancing,” 
let’s call it157—with various forms of self-limitation. Assuming, then, that 
changing the Supreme Court’s composition is the only strategy that could 
not attract reasonable constitutional scrutiny, consider the following two 
scenarios as possible Ackermanian pathways to conservative court-
packing in 2021. For the first scenario, suppose that a Democrat decisively 
ousts Trump in 2020 and sets to work not by lobbying a new, blue majority 
Congress to stack the Supreme Court decisively in their favor but by 
advocating the “balancing” addition of a tenth Justice. Anticipating 
Republican and voter backlash as a response to even this modest and fully 
legal reform, suppose further that Congress sets the effective date for the 
law after the midterms to give the American public—the “ordinary 
Americans” who hold the keys to the Constitution under Ackerman’s 
theory—an opportunity to at least have a say on whether the fresh 
 
Wheeler, as an alternative to FDR’s court-packing plan, would be a more dualist way of limiting the 
court’s power. The key part of this proposed amendment states:  
In case the Supreme Court renders any judgment holding any Act of 
Congress . . . unconstitutional, the question with respect to the constitutionality of such Act 
or provision shall be promptly submitted to the Congress for its action at the earliest 
practicable date that the Congress is in session . . . but no action shall be taken by the 
Congress upon such question until an election shall have been held at which Members of 
the House of Representatives are regularly by law to be chosen. If such Act or provision is 
re-enacted by two-thirds of each House of the Congress . . . such Act or provision shall be 
deemed to be constitutional and effective from the date of such reenactment. 
ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 321 (emphasis added). 
 157. As Epps and Sitaraman point out in their article, Eric Segall has cogently defended the idea 
that the Supreme Court should be “permanently and evenly divided along partisan and ideological 
lines” (e.g., by simply adding another Justice to stall but not override the impact of recent Republican 
appointments). See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 196. While the Democrats’ use of this strategy 
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legitimacy in the face of critical claims that hot-button issues are too often decided along starkly 
ideological lines. Id. For Segall’s proposal, see Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal 
to Improve the United States Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018). 
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appointment will be approved by a Democratic or Republican Senate (and 
maybe on whether there will be a fresh appointment at all). 
Assuming that this first option will prove unsatisfactory for 
Democrats who view court-packing as morally and strategically urgent, 
consider a second, perhaps slightly more robust option. This time, while 
the first move is once again an attempt to simply balance the Court with a 
tenth Justice, the President now decides to act more aggressively by 
relying on a supportive Congress to push his or her new Justice quickly 
through the confirmation process (no delayed effective date this time). 
However, alongside this marginally more aggressive stance, suppose that 
the President and congressional leaders band together to make an 
extraordinary pledge to the nation. They will not, they claim, pursue parts 
of their legislative agenda that they believe the prior Court would have 
invalidated or that are otherwise nationally controversial in the extreme—
not unless they hold onto Congress in the midterms. This proposal takes 
us to the second factor mentioned above in assessing the plausibility of the 
Democrats’ claim to be acting as constitutional conservatives: namely, the 
aggressiveness with which they pursue their own reform agenda. Does an 
Ackermanian approach require or favor anything like the extraordinary, 
self-limiting pledge of this scenario? 
I am not sure if an Ackermanian approach requires such self-
limitation, but there are good reasons for supposing that it implies a 
preference for it. Put simply, Ackerman’s very specific conception of 
dualist democracy is clear in at least discouraging the mixing of 
constitutional roles, specifically in the sense that proponents of reform 
usually require a fresh mandate before they proceed to a new phase of the 
higher lawmaking process158 (signaling, proposing, etc.159). In this regard, 
it would certainly make sense to suppose that special caution is required 
when a group of constitutional conservatives (in this case a Democratic 
government purporting to use court-packing as a way of terminating 
Republican transformation) wishes to shift not simply between stages of a 
 
 158. As evidence of this requirement under Ackerman’s theory, see ACKERMAN, supra note 31, 
at 63–79 (illustrating the need for fresh mandates when transitioning between phases of constitutional 
change during the civil rights movement). 
 159. Id. at 66, 72. I have not detailed all of the phases that Ackerman identifies in American 
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like—is that the American People can issue (and have issued) sovereign decisions in ways that are, at 
the time, radically new (and is not this type of radical creativity the very essence of sovereignty?). 
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constitutional moments like the New Deal or the Civil Rights Revolution, a good place to start is with 
the early chapters of We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution. See ACKERMAN, supra note 31. 
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reform process, but to shift roles completely, from constitutional 
conservatives to constitutional reformers. To legitimize this shift, I would 
suggest strongly that Ackerman’s dualism requires an electoral return to 
the voting population for support, but with this requirement a critical 
reader may detect a problematic lack of political realism. Could we really 
expect, this reader might ask, that a Democratic Party consumed by its 
own, urgent sense of justice will consciously defer the implementation of 
its political agenda despite momentarily having a wealth of political power 
in its hands? Could we really ask the supporters and prospective 
beneficiaries of that agenda to wait until after the midterms for 
implementation? And would a newly elected government that stalled like 
this really make it through those midterms unscathed, even if many voters 
recognized its honorable, dualist intentions? 
CONCLUSION 
These questions on the realism and indeed tolerability of Ackerman-
style dualism are all vitally important, and they require some clarification 
as well as some final analysis. To begin with, suppose I am right that 
moderate court-packing in 2021 is defensible from an Ackermanian, 
dualist point of view (although only in the very narrow and extremely 
limiting way just described). Does this mean that court-packing or 
balancing in 2021 can now be regarded as thinkable and, conversely, that 
more ambitious court-packing plans should be regarded as unthinkable? 
To answer this question bluntly, nothing that I have said over the course 
of this Article justifies such a sweeping conclusion. On the contrary, my 
argument—my only argument—is that Ackerman’s work offers an 
important, non-populist way of defending the democratic legitimacy of 
court-packing in 2021 (or more preferably at some point further down the 
road, in the midst of time-tested support for Democrats and their 
constitutional agenda). What the article does not say, and will not say, is 
that democratic legitimacy should be the only or primary concern when 
assessing the morality and wisdom of an initiative like court-packing. 
Indeed, even Ackerman himself concedes that, despite his fundamental 
concern with the facilitation of popular sovereignty and the “second 
dimension”160 of democracy in America, political actors will sometimes 
be well-advised to tolerate serious democratic deficits to ensure 
implementation of a socially beneficial or morally praiseworthy initiative. 
As Ackerman writes with respect to the Philadelphia Convention and its 
democratic defects: 
 
 160. See COLÓN-RÍOS, supra note 22, at 36. 
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[T]he Federalists were not conducting a philosophy seminar. They 
were trying to win. Another round of elections would have given 
Anti-Federalists a chance to win a lot of seats at the next convention, 
enabling them to defeat the Federalists’ centralizing ambitions. The 
majority in Philadelphia were utterly unwilling to take this chance. It 
had taken a lot of hard work to get to Philadelphia, and Madison & 
Co. were grimly determined to make the most of their opportunity.161 
With this passage in mind, I want to finish now by very briefly 
presenting two ways in which my Ackermanian perspective can be 
seriously challenged. Firstly, one may argue that the level of deep and 
bitter disagreement in the United States right now is such that any efforts 
at constitutional transformation outside Article V would be doomed to 
invite tireless and damaging accusations of “demagogic populism and 
lawlessness”162 from a multitude of angles (consider this an argument 
focusing on the “sociological legitimacy”163 of court-packing, if you like). 
Secondly, one may argue that the intentionally slow and staggered pace of 
change advocated by Ackerman’s dualism (and captured by the two 
proposals put forward in the preceding Section) errs by leaving those 
affected by problematic laws and policies to wait out their suffering, 
haplessly, while their fellow citizens deliberate across a full generation. 
Upon hearing these two counter-arguments, an Ackermanian dualist 
may retort: indeed, these are problems, but they actually reveal the great 
merit of Ackerman’s theory. To explain this claim, it should be obvious 
from my framing of the two problems above that one cannot address both 
of them at the same time, since resisting controversial strategies to mitigate 
social or institutional “backlash”164 will mean abandoning your full pursuit 
of justice (as you see it) and vice versa. However, as Ackerman argues in 
the second volume of We the People, while we cannot have our cake and 
eat it too, we can still try to walk the line between our most cherished 
constitutional objectives.165 In this regard (and as noted earlier), Ackerman 
presents his theory as a “third way”166 of dealing with constitutional 
change—an approach that seeks to transcend the gulf between “legalistic 
 
 161. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 89. 
 162. See ACKERMAN, supra note 126. 
 163. See Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,  
1843–44 (2005). 
 164. See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373 (2007). 
 165. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 33. 
 166. Id.; see also Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative 
Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures? , 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
193, 203 (2008). 
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perfection”167 and “lawless force,”168 hopeless hesitance (in the face of 
potential backlash), and overzealousness (in order to pursue justice as we 
understand it). Isn’t this, the retorting dualist may ask, the best that we can 
actually do given “the misfortune of how things are”169 in the increasingly 
dis-United States? 
Maybe so. But as a counterpoint, consider the following 
hypothetical. Late in 2021, a Democratic President and Congress watch in 
horror as the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade,170 thereby legalizing 
severely restrictive abortion laws of the type that numerous states have just 
passed in our own, non-hypothetical reality.171 How do they respond? Do 
they act swiftly to pack the Supreme Court or to reinstate Roe by less 
secure means (e.g., ordinary legislation)? Or do they take a more 
incremental approach, perhaps “balancing” the Court in the way I have 
just proposed while pledging legislative restraint on controversial issues 
like abortion until (or rather, unless) they retain their mandate in the 
midterms. To the extent that Ackermanian dualism, on my no doubt 
contestable reading, carries a preference for the latter path or some version 
of it, how could we justify this choice to all those affected by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the interim? What do we say, for example, to the young 
woman in Alabama who has been raped, but who, rather than finding the 
criminal law by her side, now stares down the barrel of a system that 
threatens her with serious violence if she terminates the resultant 
pregnancy? Can we confidently present someone in her position with the 
claim that, despite having the power to act, and despite their professed, 
intense opposition to the Supreme Court’s decision, Democrats should 
wait it out? No matter how we spin it, this is a deeply troubling question 
for political and constitutional theories of the Ackermanian type—theories 
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that advocate “minimalism”172 over “heroism”173 to borrow Cass 
Sunstein’s terminology. Is it a question that is troubling enough to warrant 
a more heroic, urgent approach on issues like abortion, an approach that 
may involve endorsing more extreme forms of court-packing (or related 
tactics) than my reading of Ackerman allows for? I leave that up to you 
but with a residual question attached. The question is, if you believe your 
perspective on such issues is right, and you believe that your government 
is entitled to act decisively despite deep disagreement within your society 
on a given issue, what separates you from the populists who believe that 
“they, and they alone, can represent the people”?174 I do not mean to 
suggest that this question is unanswerable; only that it is a critical moral 
and strategic question for American liberals in the months and years ahead. 
 
 172. I borrow this term from Cass Sunstein, who uses it to refer to judges (although I dare say 
that it is usefully applicable to political actors in general). To quote: 
Some judges are . . . Minimalists, in the sense that they favor small, cautious steps, building 
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those who adopt the minimalist Persona emphasize the limits of large-scale theories. They 
emphasize that human beings, and judges in particular, have a limited stock of reason. They 
embrace the idea of humility. 
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